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Abstract 
Grounded (embodied) theories of cognition propose that 
memory, including knowledge and meaning, is grounded in 
sensorimotor and mental state processes. The main proposed 
mechanism for how memory is grounded is mental 
simulation. Simulation occurs when neural activity in modal 
association cortex triggers time-locked, recurrent and 
feedback activity across multiple lower-level modal 
processing areas from which the memory was initially 
constructed. Through this distributed multi-regional activity, 
seeing an object or reading its name (e.g., “dog”) re-enacts 
associated features that were stored during earlier learning 
experiences (e.g. its shape, color, motion, actions with it), 
thereby constructing cognition, memory, and meaning. This 
paper reviews convergent evidence from cognitive 
neuroscience of mental imagery, object cognition, and 
memory that supports a multi-state interactive (MUSI) 
account of automatic and strategic mental simulation 
mechanisms that can ground memory, including the meaning, 
of objects in modal processing of visual features. 
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The MUSI account of the brain dynamics of visual object 
cognition proposes that posterior object processing areas 
activate at different times in at least 3 states performing 
distinct functions (Schendan & Ganis, 2012; Schendan & 
Kutas, 2007). In state 1, initial activation of object 
processing cortex feeds forward from occipital to anterior 
temporal cortex. In this state, from ~120 to 200 ms, an 
object is perceptually categorized coarsely for the first time 
(Ganis & Schendan, 2008; Ganis, Smith, & Schendan, 2012; 
Schendan & Ganis, 2013; Schendan, Ganis, & Kutas, 1998). 
An event-related potential (ERP) that localizes to 
occipitotemporal cortex, the N170/VPP, shows the first 
clear object-sensitivity (i.e., greater for intact objects than 
scrambled versions depicting no figure), which is a hallmark 
of this cortex using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) (Schendan & Lucia, 2010; Schendan & Stern, 
2007). However, cognitive factors (e.g., mental imagery, 
category decision success, meaning, semantic context) 
modulate this cortex sensitively in fMRI studies but do not 
likewise affect the N170/VPP (e.g., Ganis & Kutas, 2003; 
Schendan & Lucia, 2009; Schendan & Lucia, 2010; 
Schendan & Maher, 2009). Thus object information 
activated in state 1 supports categorical perception, but 
cognition that enables complex behavior (e.g., deciding the 
object is a member of the dog category) does not start until 
later, in a second state. 
State 2 operates from ~200 to 500 ms when 
occipitotemporal cortex is activated again but in a sustained, 
interactive manner dominated by feedback and recurrent 
processing among these areas and with ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (VLPFC). The frontal N3(00) complex is 
the first ERP to reflect activity in occipitotemporal cortex 
related to the success of visual object cognition. Like the 
N170/VPP (state 1) and fMRI activation, the N3 is object-
sensitive, category-specific, and shows adaptation effects 
(Ganis & Schendan, 2008; Schendan & Ganis, 2012; 
Schendan & Lucia, 2010). However, unlike state 1 but like 
occipitotemporal and VLPFC activity in fMRI, the N3 
varies dramatically with mental imagery and factors 
affecting category decision success, such as stimulus 
typicality and impoverishment, implicit memory, 
knowledge, and meaning (Ganis & Kutas, 2003; Philiastides 
& Sajda, 2007; Schendan & Ganis, 2012; Schendan & 
Kutas, 2002, 2003, 2007; Schendan & Lucia, 2009, 2010; 
Schendan & Maher, 2009; Schendan & Stern, 2008; Voss, 
Schendan, & Paller, 2010). Later from 300 to 500 ms, the 
centroparietal N400 reflects semantic memory activation 
related to processing word-related information in anterior 
temporal cortex and VLPFC (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). 
Intriguingly, N3 effects start and peak before those on the 
N400, placing the N3 in a temporal position to reflect 
processes supporting mental simulation of object 
information that constructs the meaning analyses indexed by 
the N400. State 2 reflects decision, implicit memory, 
knowledge, and meaning processes distinct from earlier 
state 1 and later state 3 processes. 
State 3 operates from ~400 to 900 ms during complex 
cognitive tasks and evaluates internally the accuracy of 
earlier and ongoing decision processes and executes 
verification processes, including effortful, strategic, 
conscious mental simulations. These brain dynamics are 
reflected in a centroparietal late positive complex (LPC) that 
distinguishes between correct and wrong decisions but does 
not vary with how well the stimulus matches memory, 
which, by contrast, sensitively modulates the N3 (Schendan 
& Kutas, 2002; Schendan & Maher, 2009). The LPC varies 
with episodic recollection, as when recalling details of the 
learning experience during recognition and mental imagery 
tasks (Rugg & Curran, 2007; Schendan & Ganis, 2012), as 
does a default mode network that connects strongly with the 
mediotemporal system for episodic memory and is 
associated with episodic simulation and strategic, conscious 
mental imagery (Ganis & Schendan, 2011; Schacter, Addis, 
& Buckner, 2008). Such late processes, however, may also 
support complex semantic analysis (e.g., Sitnikova, Goff, & 
Kuperberg, 2009). Thus the LPC reflects internal evaluation 
and verification processes that also support strategic, 
conscious, goal-driven mental simulation that can contribute 
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to grounding cognition in more abstract and complex ways 
than earlier automatic mental simulation.  
The MUSI account can explain object cognition as well as 
the brain mechanisms of mental simulation to ground 
cognition in visual object processing, positing two 
functionally-distinct states of mental simulation: Earlier 
automatic simulation and later strategic simulation 
(Schendan & Ganis, 2012). Crucially for grounded 
cognition theory, the pattern of mental imagery findings on 
the N3, N400, and LPC resembles that for repetition 
priming of perceived pictures, implicating these ERPs as 
markers of mental simulation. Following initial categorical 
perception of objects in state 1, interactive, top-down and 
reflexive feedback, and recurrent processes in state 2 
support automatic mental simulation to ground knowledge 
and meaning (Barsalou, 2009) in modal processing of visual 
features in occipitotemporal cortex (N3) and word-related 
semantic processes in anterior temporal cortex (N400). The 
second type of mental simulation is strategic, goal-directed, 
and conscious and recruited when the task demands internal 
evaluation of cognition, as in mental imagery and episodic 
memory tasks. This simulation reflects intentional top-down 
processes directed by lateral prefrontal and posterior parietal 
networks for attention, cognitive control, and working 
memory (LPC). These neural markers of automatic and 
strategic mental simulation should be the focus of needed 
research into the brain mechanisms for how modal 
information processing grounds cognition.  
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